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FEATURE COMMENT: Reflections On The 
Federal Procurement Landscape
Having	recently	completed	my	service	as	the	Ad-
ministrator	for	Federal	Procurement	Policy,	I	want	
to	set	out	here	my	thoughts	about	the	current	state	
of	 the	 federal	procurement	 system.	 I	was	greatly	
honored	to	be	nominated	by	the	president	in	Octo-
ber	2009,	and	confirmed	by	the	Senate	in	November	
2009.	More	 than	20	 years	 of	work	 in	 the	 federal	
procurement	law	field,	first	in	private	practice	and	
then	at	the	Government	Accountability	Office,	pro-
vided	me	with	 the	 advantage	 of	 familiarity	with	
the	procurement	system	and	with	many	of	the	key	
stakeholders,	especially	the	attorneys.	
By	 the	 time	 I	 was	 sworn	 in,	 shortly	 after	
Thanksgiving	2009,	the	administration	had	already	
issued	a	number	of	significant	procurement-related	
documents.	While	 those	 documents	 reflected	 a	
range	of	policies,	 I	viewed	my	key	goals	as	 three	
in	number:	 strengthen	 the	acquisition	workforce,	
increase	 fiscal	 responsibility	 in	 acquisition	 and	
rebalance	our	relationship	with	contractors.	Those	
goals	were	not	driven	by	ideology—at	least	not	on	
my	part—but	by	an	assessment	of	the	reality	we	
faced	in	2009.
Before	 turning	 to	 these,	 it	 is	worth	 contem-
plating	the	goals	that	are	not	on	the	list.	I	had	no	
interest	in	pushing	another	wave	of	“procurement	
reform”	in	the	sense	of	legal	reform	because	I	do	
not	view	our	acquisition	statutes	as	out	of	date,	
nor	 do	 I	 believe	 that	 our	 regulations	 require	 a	
major	 rewrite.	 On	 the	 contrary:	Observing	 the	
legal	reforms	in	other	countries,	whether	it	is	the	
EU’s	proposal	 to	revamp	 its	Procurement	Direc-
tive	 or	 the	World	Trade	 Organization’s	 newly	
revised	Agreement	on	Government	Procurement,	
I	am	struck	by	how	fundamentally	sound	our	le-
gal	 framework	 is	and	how	 little	 legal	 reform	we	
need.	That	is	not	to	say	that	the	Federal	Acquisi-
tion	Regulation	 cannot	 be	 improved—I	 remain	
concerned,	for	example,	about	the	adequacy	of	the	
FAR’s	guidance	on	blanket	purchase	agreements	
and	 task	 orders—but	 the	 federal	 procurement	
system	does	not	require	a	massive	revision	along	
the	lines	of	what	was	done	in	the	1990s.
Contrary	 to	 some	 people’s	 hopes,	 I	 also	 did	
not	view	insourcing	as	a	goal.	While,	as	explained	
below,	 some	 insourcing	was	 needed	where	work	
had	been	improperly	contracted	out,	I	never	took	
the	view	that	insourcing	per	se	should	serve	as	a	
goal.	For	various	reasons,	I	also	had	little	appetite	
for	restarting	public-private	competitions,	whether	
under	a	revised	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	
Circular	A-76	or	otherwise.	
Strengthening the Federal Acquisition 
Workforce—Virtually	everyone	paying	attention	
to	the	U.S.	procurement	system	since	the	1990s	has	
decried	the	decline	of	the	acquisition	workforce.	My	
new	colleagues	at	The	George	Washington	Univer-
sity	Law	School	 repeatedly	chronicled	 this	 trend.	
See,	 e.g.,	 Schooner,	 Feature	 Comment,	 “Empty	
Promise	For	The	Acquisition	Workforce,”	 47	GC	
¶	203;	Yukins,	Feature	Comment,	“A	Pedagogical	
Perspective	On	Training	The	Acquisition	Work-
force,”	 47	GC	¶	 204.	One	 of	 the	most	 thorough	
analyses	of	 the	 impact	of	 that	decline	on	 the	na-
tion’s	defense	capabilities	was	that	led	by	Professor	
Jacques	Gansler,	former	undersecretary	of	defense	
for	 acquisition,	 technology	and	 logistics	 and	now	
at	the	University	of	Maryland.	Urgent Reform Re-
quired: Army Expeditionary Contracting,	Report	of	
the	Commission	on	Army	Acquisition	and	Program	
Management	 in	Expeditionary	Operations	 (Oct.	
31,	 2007)	 (commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	Gansler	
Commission	Report).	As	professors	Schooner	and	
Yukins,	the	Gansler	Commission,	and	others	have	
pointed	out,	the	acquisition	workforce	crisis	is	far	
more	significant	than	the	mere	decline	in	numbers	
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over	the	past	20	years,	because	training	and	stature	
also	suffered	during	the	last	two	decades.	
Moreover,	 the	 decline	was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	
personnel	 in	 the	 agencies’	 contracting	 offices	 (the	
people	 in	 the	 1102	 job	 series).	Virtually	 every	key	
role	 in	 acquisition	planning,	 as	well	 as	 in	 contract	
management,	was	 overstretched,	undertrained	and	
undervalued.	To	 give	 one	 specific,	 but	 very	 impor-
tant,	 example:	During	my	 tenure	as	administrator,	
I	consistently	heard	concern	that	both	defense	and	
civilian	agencies	had	 failed	 to	maintain	a	 cadre	 of	
cost	and	pricing	specialists,	which	led	to	inadequate	
acquisition	planning,	poorly	conducted	negotiations	
and	failures	in	contract	administration.
Particularly	problematic	because	the	Government	
dramatically	 expanded	 reliance	 on	 contractors	was	
the	failure	to	appoint	and	train	enough	contracting	
officer’s	representatives	or	CO’s	technical	represen-
tatives.	Those	 officials	 represent	 the	Government	
in	 the	 field,	 and—when	 adequately	 equipped	 and	
trained—play	a	critical	role	as	COs’	“eyes	and	ears,”	
ensuring	that	the	contractors	perform	in	accordance	
with	the	contract,	and	timely	alerting	the	COs	when	
contractors	run	into	unexpected	problems	or	fail	to	
meet	 their	 contractual	obligations.	Many	observers	
have	documented	the	impact	of	inadequate	staffing	
of	 the	COR	 function,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	
overseas	work.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Commission	 on	Wartime	
Contracting	 in	Afghanistan	and	 Iraq	 (CWC),	Final 
Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contract-
ing: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks	(August	2011)	
at	 162–63;	Dickinson,	Outsourcing	War	and	Peace:	
Preserving	Public	Values	 in	 a	World	 of	Privatized	
Foreign	Affairs	(2011)	at	82–86.	
Increasing Fiscal Responsibility—This	 pri-
ority,	 too,	was	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 changes	 that	 had	
occurred	 in	 the	years	between	1992	and	2009,	and	
especially	since	2001.	The	amount	of	taxpayer	funds	
spent	on	contracted	goods	and	services	rose	almost	
nonstop	from	1992	through	2009.	Instead	of	annual	
figures	in	the	range	of	$150–$200	billion,	as	we	had	
seen	 in	the	1990s,	by	2009	we	were	spending	$550	
billion	a	year.	That	rate	of	increase—something	like	
12	 percent	 per	 year	 between	2001	 and	2009—was	
unsustainable.	Moreover,	 the	 increased	 spending	
translated	 into	 increased	work	 for	 the	 overworked	
acquisition	professionals	in	the	agencies.
The	dramatic	dollar	increases	only	tell	part	of	the	
story.	How	we	bought	was	also	problematic.	More	and	
more,	we	had	 shifted	 from	 individual	 procurement	
contracts	to	the	use	of	indefinite-delivery,	indefinite-
quantity	 contracts,	 frequently	 awarded	 to	multiple	
contractors	and	often	used	by	multiple	agencies.	The	
General	 Services	Administration’s	Federal	 Supply	
Schedule	 (FSS)	 alone	 came	 to	 account	 for	 nearly	
$40	billion	in	annual	sales—nearly	one	in	12	of	the	
taxpayer	dollars	paid	to	contractors.	When	the	FSS	
number	is	included	in	the	overall	figure	for	spending	
going	through	IDIQ	contracts,	our	estimate	was	that	
it	 reached	something	 like	$200	billion	a	year.	That	
shifted	the	focus	in	the	acquisition	system	from	the	
award	of	these	“umbrella”	contracts	to	the	award	of	
task	 and	delivery	 orders	 under	 them.	But	 at	 that	
lower	 level,	 the	 rules,	 at	 least	as	 they	were	widely	
understood	in	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	led	to	
inadequate	 transparency,	 competition	and	account-
ability.	Although	Congress	had	 legislated	 improve-
ments	 in	 all	 three	 of	 those	 areas	 in	 recent	 years,	
implementation	challenges	abounded.	
The	situation	was	made	more	complicated	by	two	
further	changes,	one	substantive,	one	procedural.	The	
substantive	change	was	the	shift	from	buying	mainly	
goods	 to	 buying	mainly	 services.	Buying	 services,	
especially	professional	 services,	 requires	 skills	 and	
knowledge	different	from	what	is	needed	to	buy	goods,	
and	the	skills	and	knowledge	were	not	always	pres-
ent	in	our	acquisition	workforce.	To	those	challenges	
we	had	added,	in	the	world	of	the	FSS,	a	new	layer	of	
procedural	complexity,	through	the	widespread	use	of	
blanket	purchase	agreements.	
Developed	 for	 reasons	outside	 the	scope	of	 this	
FeaTure CommenT,	BPAs	became	a	new	layer	between	
the	FSS	contracts	and	the	individual	task	and	deliv-
ery	 orders.	Unlike	 the	Government-wide	FSS	 con-
tracts,	BPAs	have	typically	been	agency-specific	(or	
even	component-specific),	and,	again	unlike	the	FSS	
contracts,	they	have	been	cloaked	in	a	lack	of	trans-
parency.	The	result	was	that	if	a	CO	in	one	agency	
was	considering	entering	into	a	BPA	with	a	vendor	
for	goods	or	services	under	the	vendor’s	FSS,	she	or	
he	would	effectively	have	no	way	 to	know	whether	
another	agency	had	already	negotiated	and	signed	a	
BPA	for	the	same	goods	or	services	with	that	vendor.	
Instead,	the	CO	would	need	to	spend	time	and	effort	
negotiating	a	new	BPA	with	the	vendor,	which	might	
have	prices	less	favorable	than	those	already	negoti-
ated	by	the	other	agency.	In	short,	BPAs,	as	they	were	
being	used,	encouraged	agency-	and	even	component-
specific	contracting,	and	impeded	Government-wide	
approaches.
¶ 51
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Rebalancing Relations between the Gov-
ernment and Contractors—In	 the	 years	 since	
1992,	 relations	 between	 the	Government	 and	 its	
contractors	 had	 changed	 dramatically	 and,	 in	 our	
judgment,	gotten	badly	out	of	balance.	One	example	
is	 the	weakness	 of	 the	Government’s	management	
of	its	contractors,	noted	above,	but	there	were	more	
fundamental	 imbalances.	One	was	 highlighted	 in	
the	Memorandum	on	Government	Contracting	that	
President	Obama	issued	March	4,	2009.	As	the	presi-
dent	explained	in	that	memo,	the	line	between	work	
that	could	appropriately	be	assigned	to	contractors	
and	work	that	should	be	reserved	for	performance	by	
federal	employees	had	become	blurred.	
Since	 the	mid-1990s,	 an	 enormous	 amount	 of	
work	that	historically	had	been	performed	by	civil	
servants	was	outsourced	 to	 contractors.	While	 the	
decision	to	outsource	was	sometimes	based	on	solid	
analysis,	 in	many	 cases	 it	was	 driven	 by	 ideology	
(some	believed	that	contractors	were	by	definition	
less	expensive	or	more	efficient),	or	by	all-too-prac-
tical	 considerations	 (getting	 contractors	 on	 board	
through	a	 task	order	under	an	existing	IDIQ	con-
tract	can	be	accomplished	much	faster	than	hiring	
federal	employees),	or	even	by	what	I	suspect	were	
unconscious	political	assumptions	regarding	optics	
(by	relying	on	contractors,	the	Government	could	do	
just	as	much	without	looking	like	“big	government”).	
But	whatever	 the	 reason,	 the	Federal	Govern-
ment	had	come	to	depend	on	contractors—at	home,	
but	also	in	Iraq,	Afghanistan	and	elsewhere	overseas.	
And	dependence	 on	 contractors	 sometimes	 crossed	
the	line	from	healthy	use	to	unhealthy	overreliance,	
especially	with	respect	to	services.	As	the	CWC	wrote	
in	its	report,	the	use	of	contractors	had	become	the	
“default	option.”	I	remember	a	junior	member	of	an	
agency’s	 contracting	 office	 telling	me,	 in	 a	mix	 of	
frustration	 and	 regret,	 that	 in	 her	 agency	 service	
contractors	told	the	agency	what	it	needed,	wrote	up	
those	needs	as	statements	of	requirements	and	then	
won	contracts	to	meet	those	needs.	At	another	agency,	
I	was	told	that	no	federal	employee	understood	the	
agency’s	information	technology	system	and	that	the	
contractors	were	in	control.
Coupled	with	 these	 problems,	 though,	 I	 also	
heard	repeatedly	about	a	breakdown	in	communica-
tion	 between	 the	Government	 and	 contractors.	 In	
many	cases,	I	heard	that	the	acquisition	profession-
als	were	uncertain	how	to	interact	with	contractors.	
They	 feared	 that	 communications	with	 contractors	
would	lead	to	problems	with	their	agency’s	inspector	
general	or	their	agency’s	attorneys,	or	to	the	filing	of	
a	bid	protest.	In	many	cases,	it	seems,	the	overworked	
federal	acquisition	staff	simply	did	not	believe	that	
they	could	afford	to	take	time	to	meet	with	contrac-
tors.	Whatever	the	reason,	the	result	was	a	strained	
relationship	with	inadequate	communication.
Tackling the Priorities—Throughout	my	ten-
ure	as	OFPP	administrator,	I	worked	to	open	up	chan-
nels	of	communication.	With	my	background	in	acqui-
sition,	I	was	comfortable	listening	to	other	acquisition	
professionals	across	the	Federal	Government,	and	I	
did	 that	 in	 abundance.	For	 example,	 the	 priorities	
set	out	above,	and	potential	ways	to	address	them,	
were	discussed	in	meetings	of	the	Chief	Acquisition	
Officers	Council	 as	well	 as	 in	monthly	 conference	
calls	that	we	initiated	with	agencies’	senior	procure-
ment	executives.	Because	the	Department	of	Defense	
accounts	for	more	than	60	percent	of	contract	spend-
ing,	I	spent	much	time	working	with	DOD,	especially	
with	the	leadership	of	the	Defense	Procurement	and	
Acquisition	Policy	office.	
We	also	revived	the	Front	Line	Forum	that	Pro-
fessor	Steve	Kelman	had	created	when	he	was	OFPP	
administrator	in	the	mid-1990s.	Four	times	per	year,	
we	brought	together	about	three	dozen	front-line	ac-
quisition	staff	from	civilian	and	defense	agencies.	We	
heard	their	views	on	the	challenges	they	faced	and	
on	the	steps	that	we	were	considering	taking.	I	also	
conducted	dozens	of	visits	to	agencies,	and	whether	
at	Kirtland	Air	Force	base	in	Albuquerque,	N.M.,	or	
at	 the	Centers	 for	Medicare	and	Medicaid	Services	
outside	Baltimore,	Md.,	whether	 at	 large	 agencies	
or	small	ones,	the	discussions	were	a	chance	to	hear	
from	people	on	the	front	line	and	to	get	their	input.
Throughout	my	 tenure,	 I	 also	met	with	 other	
stakeholders	in	the	complex	world	of	federal	acquisi-
tion.	From	my	very	first	day	on	the	job,	I	was	meeting	
with	contractors—officials	from	professional	associa-
tions	as	well	as	from	individual	companies—because	
I	was	determined	to	increase	and	improve	communi-
cation	between	us	in	the	administration	and	Govern-
ment	 contractors.	Meeting	with	 other	 stakeholders	
was	a	routine	part	of	my	job,	including	(but,	as	they	
say,	not	 limited	 to)	members	 of	Congress	and	 their	
staff;	 trade	unions	 and	 their	 representatives;	 staff	
from	GAO,	where	I	worked	before	my	appointment	as	
OFPP	administrator;	academics;	and	representatives	
of	professional	associations,	such	as	the	American	Bar	
Association’s	Section	of	Public	Contract	Law.
¶ 51
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From	the	start,	we	were	 focused	on	addressing	
the	 three	 priorities	 set	 out	 above.	But	 there	were,	
of	course,	other	issues	along	the	way,	some	of	them	
very	 important,	 such	 as	 increasing	 small	 business	
participation	in	the	federal	marketplace.	Other	issues	
were	frustrating	distractions,	such	as	responding	to	
efforts	 on	 the	Hill	 to	 legislate	 automatic,	 punitive	
debarment	of	contractors	for	various	reasons.	While	
our	work	was	 sometimes	used	by	 stakeholders	 for	
parochial	 purposes—to	 trash	 the	 federal	workforce	
or	 bash	 contractors,	 depending	 on	 the	 individual	
stakeholder’s	agenda—we	tried	to	stay	focused	on	our	
priorities	throughout.
Progress Made in Strengthening the Ac-
quisition Workforce—Although	 the	progress	was	
limited	and	 the	 outlook	 remains	problematic,	 I	 be-
lieve	 that	we	made	headway	 in	 strengthening	 the	
federal	acquisition	workforce.	In	terms	of	numbers,	
the	president’s	fiscal	year	2011	budget	included	$158	
million	for	the	civilian	agency	acquisition	workforce	
(the	Department	of	Defense	has	separate	 funding).	
Despite	the	investment	of	much	time	on	the	Hill	and	
the	generally	supportive	 reaction	we	received	 from	
both	Republicans	and	Democrats,	in	both	houses,	we	
did	not	get	the	full	$158	million	we	asked	for—but	we	
nonetheless	saw	agencies	devote	more	resources	 to	
their	acquisition	professionals.	That	pattern	repeated	
itself	for	FY	2012	as	well.	
We	succeeded	in	reversing	the	trend	of	slashing	
the	numbers	of	1102s,	both	across	DOD	and	in	many	
(but	not	all)	civilian	agencies.	The	numbers	of	1102s	
are	up,	 on	 the	 order	 of	 a	 5-	 to	 12-percent	 increase	
from	a	few	years	earlier.	While	the	various	formulas	
for	calculating	the	number	of	contracting	staff	that	
an	agency	needs	are	problematic,	I	am	confident	that	
we	are	not	 yet	 at	 an	adequate	 level.	Moreover,	we	
still	have	a	disproportionate	number	of	acquisition	
staff	in	many	agencies	who	are	at	or	near	retirement	
eligibility,	so	we	must	anticipate	a	large	number	of	
retirements	over	the	next	five	years.	
With	the	mood	on	the	Hill	not	favorable	to	further	
federal	hiring,	 I	 am	 concerned	 that	we	will	 repeat	
the	mistake	of	the	past	and	let	the	number	of	1102s	
go	 down	 again.	There	 is	 some	 comfort	 in	 hearing	
supportive	words	 from	all	 sides;	notably,	 both	Rep.	
James	Lankford	(R-Okla.),	chair	of	the	Oversight	and	
Government	Reform	Subcommittee	 on	Technology,	
Information	Policy,	Intergovernmental	Relations	and	
Procurement	Reform,	and	Rep.	Gerry	Connolly	(D-Va.),	
ranking	member	on	that	subcommittee,	expressed	sup-
port	for	the	acquisition	workforce	in	my	last	hearing	
as	administrator,	on	Nov.	16,	2011.	Nonetheless,	as	I	
indicated	at	that	subcommittee	hearing,	I	believe	that	
the	acquisition	workforce	numbers	are	very	much	at	
risk	going	forward.
Tracking	the	numbers	for	members	of	the	acqui-
sition	workforce	 outside	 the	 contracting	 offices—in	
particular,	for	contracting	officer’s	representatives—is	
more	difficult	than	counting	1102s.	For	various	rea-
sons,	DOD	does	not	count	CORs	as	part	of	the	acqui-
sition	workforce	 at	 all,	 and	 obtaining	 reliable	 data	
at	civilian	agencies	presents	a	challenge	as	well.	The	
Federal	Acquisition	Institute	(FAI)	has	been	working	
to	develop	a	database	 that	will	 include	better	data	
on	CORs,	but,	as	of	now,	the	information	is	far	from	
complete.	
In	terms	of	training	for	the	workforce,	we	made	
some	progress,	but,	as	with	the	numbers,	the	progress	
is	tenuous.	Both	the	Defense	Acquisition	University	
and	FAI	are	under	new	leadership	that	is	committed	
to	 improving	 training.	 In	 addition,	 other	 agencies	
have	 also	 improved	 their	 training	 capability,	most	
notably	the	Department	of	Veterans	Affairs,	with	its	
Acquisition	Academy	in	Frederick,	Md.	The	challenge	
will	be	 to	ensure	that	all	of	 those	 facilities	provide	
training	 that	 is	well-designed,	 relevant	and	 timely.	
Some	 of	 the	 course	material	 that	 I	 saw	was	 quite	
good,	and	the	heightened	emphasis	on	having	useful	
training	 for	CORs	 is	 particularly	 encouraging.	De-
spite	the	improvements,	I	did	not	hear	consistently	
positive	feedback	from	the	people	on	the	front	lines	
of	the	contracting	agencies,	so	much	work	evidently	
remains	to	be	done—and	in	a	world	in	which	budget	
pressures	put	training	dollars	at	risk.
Progress Made in Buying Less and Buying 
Smarter—The	administration	did	succeed	 in	stop-
ping	the	year-on-year	increases	in	spending.	That	was	
not	something	that	the	acquisition	workforce	could	do,	
of	course,	since	it	is	program	personnel,	not	contract-
ing	staff,	who	determine	an	agency’s	needs,	whether	it	
is	major	weapon	systems	or	support	services.	But	the	
president	set	a	tone	of	restraint	in	spending,	and	the	
message	clearly	got	through.	In	FY	2010,	for	the	first	
time	since	1997	(and,	aside	from	a	limited	increase	
in	that	year,	for	the	first	time	since	1993),	spending	
on	contracts	went	down:	from	about	$550	billion	in	
FY	2009	to	just	over	$535	billion	in	FY	2010.	The	FY	
2011	figures	are	apparently	in	that	same	lower	range.	
That	still	means	more	than	half	a	trillion	dollars	of	
taxpayer	 funds	 spent	 on	 contracts	 each	 year—but,	
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as	with	the	number	of	the	acquisition	workforce—at	
least	the	problematic	prior	trend	was	reversed.
The	focus	of	our	efforts	 in	the	Office	of	Federal	
Procurement	Policy	was	buying	smarter.	It	was	here,	
I	 believe,	 that	 our	 efforts	 to	 strengthen,	 listen	 to	
and	work	with	the	acquisition	workforce	paid	off.	In	
dozens,	if	not	hundreds,	of	meetings,	we	encouraged	
federal	acquisition	professionals	to	innovate,	try	dif-
ferent	approaches	and	 learn	from	one	another.	The	
result:	new	ideas	being	tried,	and	word	about	them	
being	shared	across	the	Government.	I	remember	a	
meeting	with	one	agency	in	which	I	learned	that	they	
had	never	 tried	an	electronic	 reverse	auction—and	
when	they	heard	how	the	auctions	work,	they	were	
enthusiastic	to	try	one.	Similarly,	at	the	annual	re-
views	we	conducted	with	most	contracting	agencies	
(called	AcqStats,	for	acquisition	status	reviews),	we	
learned	of	innovative	approaches	that	agencies	were	
developing,	and	we	shared	that	information.
We	promoted	a	reduction	in	the	use	of	contract	
types	that	were	risky	for	the	Government,	and	there-
fore	for	the	taxpayers:	contracts	awarded	sole-source,	
and	where	a	competition	was	held,	but	only	one	bid	
came	in;	and	contracts	for	which	the	pricing	structure	
shifted	 too	much	 cost	 risk	 to	 the	Government.	We	
found	broad	agreement	about	 the	need	 to	 increase	
competition,	and	I	was	heartened	by	DOD’s	focus	on	
“real	competition”	and	reducing	the	number	of	one-bid	
competitions.	(I	should	note	in	passing	that,	although	
DOD	often	announced	its	own	initiatives,	they	were	
fully	consistent	with	the	Government-wide	effort.)	
On	pricing	structures,	 I	often	heard	agreement	
on	the	need	to	reduce	the	use	of	time-and-materials	
contracts,	but	I	also	heard	concerns	that	pressure	to	
reduce	 the	 use	 of	 cost-reimbursement	 contracting	
might	lead	to	bad	results.	Those	concerns	resonated,	
so	I	focused	primarily	on	increasing	competition	and	
reducing	the	use	of	T&M	contracts.	In	our	AcqStats	
with	agencies,	we	saw	considerable	progress	on	both	
of	those	fronts,	but,	particularly	with	respect	to	avoid-
ing	sole-source	and	one-bid	contracts,	this	is	clearly	a	
battle	that	will	need	to	be	fought	again	and	again	to	
increase	the	competition	that	is	a	bedrock	principle	
of	our	acquisition	system.
An	 important	 development	 that	 arose	 from	
studying	 the	data	and	 conducting	discussions	with	
agency	personnel	was	our	focus	on	increasing	fiscal	
responsibility	in	what	we	came	to	call	management	
support	services—a	suite	of	services	that	include	in-
formation	technology	support	as	well	as	more	general	
professional	advisory	services.	We	became	convinced	
that	 spending	 on	 these	 services	warranted	 further	
attention,	for	several	reasons.	
First,	 they	were	 an	 area	 of	 particularly	 fast	
growth—the	 rate	 of	 increase	 in	 spending	 on	 them	
exceeded	the	already	rapid	increase	in	contract	spend-
ing	generally.	Second,	contracts	for	these	services	are	
frequently	 structured	 as	T&M	 contracts,	with	 the	
associated	 cost	 risk	 to	 the	Government.	And	 third,	
when	we	asked	agency	personnel	to	identify	services	
for	which	they	were	concerned	about	overreliance	on	
contractors,	 these	 services	were	 often	named.	The	
bottom	 line	was	 that	we	decided,	by	mid-2011,	 that	
we	needed	to	restrain	spending	in	this	area—not	to	
stop	it,	but	to	restrain	it—and	to	be	sure	that	agencies	
focused	on	why	and	how	they	were	using	contractors	
for	management	support.	I	am	optimistic	that	we	will	
achieve	the	goal	of	a	10-percent	reduction	in	spending	
on	these	services,	from	something	over	$40	billion	in	
FY	2010,	in	the	course	of	FY	2012.
Throughout	my	tenure	as	OFPP	administrator,	a	
central	part	of	our	effort	to	promote	smarter	buying	
related	 to	 interagency	 contracting.	The	 fact	 is	 that	
when	multiple	agencies	buy	the	same	goods	or	ser-
vices	on	their	own,	there	is	a	great	risk	that	they	are	
duplicating	 one	another’s	 efforts,	wasting	 the	 time	
of	their	limited	acquisition	staff	and	not	necessarily	
all	obtaining	an	equally	good	deal.	 In	my	view,	 the	
chaos	of	interagency	contracting	in	earlier	years	had	
wrongly	led	many	people,	including	on	Capitol	Hill,	
to	conclude	that	interagency	contracting	was	inher-
ently	bad.	People	pointed	to	the	fact	that	the	Govern-
ment	Accountability	Office	had	 added	 interagency	
contracting	to	its	“high-risk”	list	as	proof	that	more	
interagency	contracting	was	bad—with	the	implica-
tion	that	more	single-agency	contracting	was	good.	
This	issue	became	a	core	concern	of	mine.	While	I	
agree	that	interagency	contracting	had	been	abused,	
and	I	therefore	agreed	when	GAO	included	interagen-
cy	 contracting	on	 its	high-risk	 list	 some	years	ago,	
our	review	led	me	to	conclude	that	the	problems	that	
GAO	had	identified—in	particular,	the	lack	of	clarity	
about	each	agency’s	roles	and	responsibilities—had	
largely	 been	addressed.	 I	was	 especially	 concerned	
about	a	misunderstanding	that	arose	repeatedly	 in	
discussions	 about	 duplication,	 an	 issue	mentioned	
in	connection	with	interagency	contracting	in	more	
recent	GAO	reports.	While	having	 two	or	 three	 in-
teragency	 contracts	 for	 similar	 goods	 and	 services	
might	 represent	 some	duplication,	 replacing	 those	
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contracts	with	 20	 or	more	 single-agency	 contracts	
would	not	 decrease	 duplication—instead,	 it	would	
dramatically	increase	it.	In	short,	I	do	not	think	that	
there	is	justification	any	longer	for	listing	interagency	
contracting	as	an	area	of	particularly	high	risk	to	the	
Government.
Perhaps	 the	most	 notable	 demonstration	 dur-
ing	my	tenure	as	OFPP	administrator	of	our	efforts	
to	 promote	 the	 use	 of	 interagency	 vehicles	 rather	
than	single-agency	ones	was	the	campaign	referred	
to	 as	 strategic	 sourcing.	As	mentioned	above,	 over	
the	prior	dozen	years,	we	had	seen	a	proliferation	of	
single-agency	blanket	purchase	agreements	under	the	
Federal	Supply	Schedules.	
We	decided	 to	work	with	 the	General	Services	
Administration	to	promote	 the	use	of	Government-
wide	BPAs.	For	various	reasons,	the	commodity	that	
we	first	took	on	was	office	supplies,	which	were	fre-
quently	being	purchased	through	single-agency,	and	
even	single-component,	BPAs.	We	encouraged	GSA,	
as	 it	met	with	 user	 agencies,	 the	 Small	Business	
Administration	and	industry,	to	develop	an	approach	
that	would	lead	to	Government-wide	BPAs	offering	
agencies	good	prices,	high	quality,	sustainability	and	
Trade	Agreements	Act	compliance—all	while	main-
taining	a	high	level	of	small	business	participation.	
Although	the	details	of	the	process	deserve	to	be	
described	 in	more	detail	 than	 is	 possible	here,	 the	
bottom	line	was	this:	GSA	ultimately	awarded	a	suite	
of	15	BPAs,	13	of	which	went	to	small	businesses.	We	
encouraged	agencies	 to	 carefully	analyze	 the	BPAs,	
and	ultimately	many	agencies	came	to	conclude	that	
the	new	BPAs	met	their	needs.	During	the	course	of	18	
months,	from	July	2010	to	December	2011,	we	watched	
agency	purchasing	of	office	supplies	shift	to	those	15	
strategic	sourcing	BPAs,	reaching	approximately	$200	
million	during	FY	2011.	 In	 the	 small	but	not	 insig-
nificant	area	of	 office	 supplies,	we	had	shifted	 from	
single-agency	vehicles	to	Government-wide	ones,	with	
results	that	were	beneficial	for	agencies,	taxpayers	and	
small	businesses—which	obtained	over	70	percent	of	
the	dollars	spent.
We	worked	with	GSA	and	multi-agency	commod-
ity	teams	to	identify	the	next	target	of	opportunity,	
which	was	print	management.	Wireless	and	software	
licenses	were	not	far	behind.	Especially	in	a	time	of	
severe	fiscal	constraints,	I	believe	that	this	shift	from	
single-agency	to	Government-wide	contract	vehicles	
holds	enormous	potential	for	buying	smarter	in	the	
years	to	come.
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Putting	 these	 strategic	 sourcing	 efforts	 in	 a	
broader	context,	I	would	say	that	during	my	tenure	
we	witnessed	agencies	doing	more	by	way	 of	 inno-
vation	 to	buy	 smarter	 than	we	have	 seen	 in	many	
years—at	 least	 since	 the	wave	 of	“procurement	 re-
form”	in	the	1990s.	Evidence	of	the	breadth	and	depth	
of	what	was	happening	was	highlighted	in	a	recent	
GAO	report	that	has	received	less	attention	than	it	
deserves.	See	Federal Contracting: OMB’s Acquisition 
Savings Initiative Had Results, but Improvements 
Needed	(GAO-12-57);	53	GC	¶	383.	
While	GAO	criticized	the	Office	of	Management	
and	Budget	and	contracting	agencies	in	the	report	for	
various	reasons,	the	report	also	presented	what	I	view	
as	a	picture	of	unprecedented	progress.	Among	other	
areas,	GAO	described	agencies’	efforts	to	strengthen	
their	 acquisition	workforces,	 including	 improved	
recruitment	programs	and	better	training.	GAO	also	
recounted	some	of	the	steps	that	agencies	are	taking	
to	buy	smarter.	To	name	only	a	few	of	the	many	iden-
tified,	GAO	cited	actions	to	improve	acquisition	plan-
ning,	including	measures	to	help	with	requirements	
definition	and	selection	of	 the	appropriate	 contract	
type;	better	communication	with	contractors	to	reduce	
operational	 costs;	better	price	negotiations,	 leading	
to	 deeper	 discounts	 and	 lower	prices;	 and	 smarter	
use	of	technology	to	streamline	acquisitions,	obtain	
better	deals	 for	 taxpayers	and	promote	small	busi-
ness	participation.	I	viewed	this	as	the	consequence	
of	agencies’	acquisition	professionals	being	allowed,	
and	encouraged,	to	demonstrate	their	business	skills,	
and	the	results	have	been	impressive.
Progress Made in Rebalancing the Govern-
ment’s Relationships with Contractors—Trying	
to	right	the	distortions	in	our	relationships	with	con-
tractors	was	not	easy,	and	not	without	controversy.	
We	spent	much	time	in	my	first	18	months	on	the	job	
working	through	issues	that	were	eventually	finalized	
in	OFPP’s	policy	letter	on	inherently	governmental	
and	critical	functions.	While	this	is	not	the	place	to	
delve	into	the	details	of	the	policy	letter,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	the	final	product	benefited	from	signifi-
cant	input	from	stakeholders:	contractors	and	their	
representatives,	federal	employee	unions,	contracting	
agencies	(including	program	staff	as	well	as	acquisi-
tion	specialists),	the	Hill	and	many	others.	We	heard	
from	stakeholders	in	public	meetings,	in	written	com-
ments,	and	in	various	and	sundry	venues.	
Although	none	of	us	would	claim	that	the	policy	
letter	solved	the	problems,	I	believe	that	it	did	clarify	
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the	line	between	inherently	governmental	functions	
and	those	 that	can	properly	be	 turned	over	 to	con-
tractors.	More	importantly,	the	policy	letter	provided	
extensive	management	direction	to	agencies	on	how	
to	handle	 contractors’	 involvement	 in	 critical	 func-
tions.	We	are	not	going	to	stop	using	contractors	to	
support	our	critical	functions,	so	it	is	important	that	
we	manage	them	appropriately.	
A	 good	 part	 of	 rebalancing	 our	 dealings	with	
contractors	involves	not	taking	work	away	from	them	
(“insourcing”),	but	rather	providing	better	oversight	
and	management	(and	much	of	our	time	was	spent	
in	various	aspects	of	contract	management).	One	of	
my	disappointments	was	learning	how	poor	a	job	we	
do	at	recording	past	performance	information	about	
contractors	and	putting	it	into	the	relevant	database.	
Without	good	information	being	readily	available,	the	
benefits	of	requiring	past	performance	as	an	evalua-
tion	criterion	are	largely	lost.	As	a	result,	we	worked,	
through	the	Federal	Acquisition	Regulatory	Council	
and	in	other	ways,	to	improve	the	collection	and	use	
of	past	performance	information.	
One	of	the	most	politically	charged	areas	we	dealt	
with	was	suspension	and	debarment.	I	view	suspen-
sion	and	debarment	as	important	tools	to	protect	the	
Government’s	 interests	 going	 forward,	 and	 talking	
about	 them	 should	 be	 constructive.	Yet	 time	 and	
again,	I	found	myself	having	to	respond	to	politically	
charged	 efforts	 to	 promote	 automatic	 ineligibility	
for	firms	with	 one	 or	 another	 strike	against	 them.	
In	October	 2011,	GAO	 issued	 a	 report	 identifying	
characteristics	of	effective	suspension	and	debarment	
programs,	which	we	found	helpful,	and	we	took	those	
characteristics	into	account	in	our	efforts	to	ensure	
that	every	agency	has	a	meaningful	suspension	and	
debarment	function.
Finally,	 there	was	 the	“MythBusters”	 campaign	
to	increase	and	improve	communication	between	the	
Government	and	 contractors.	This	was	also	part	 of	
correcting	our	relationship	with	contractors,	but	this	
was	one	element	that	contractors	have	supported	en-
thusiastically.	The	campaign	grew	out	of	our	concern,	
discussed	above,	that	agency	personnel	were,	for	many	
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different	reasons,	 reluctant	 to	 talk	with	contractors,	
and	we	were	concerned	about	the	impact.	In	particu-
lar,	Vivek	Kundra	(then	our	federal	chief	information	
officer)	and	I,	when	we	and	our	teams	were	probing	
into	the	causes	of	large	IT	projects	underperforming	
and	running	over	budget	and	behind	schedule,	heard	
repeatedly	that,	during	acquisition	planning,	there	was	
inadequate	input	from	industry.	We	were	told	that	the	
most	common	result	was	a	poor	statement	of	require-
ments	 in	 the	 solicitation,	 sometimes	unrealistically	
overambitious,	in	other	cases,	calling	for	outdated	tech-
nology	or	simply	poorly	thought	through.	Together,	we	
came	up	with	the	idea	of	the	MythBusters	campaign,	
and	it	found	a	place	in	OMB’s	December	2010	25-point	
plan	to	improve	federal	IT	purchasing.	I	spent	much	
time	during	my	final	 year	 at	OFPP	promoting	 the	
MythBusters	effort,	which	involves	a	culture	change	
and	will	require	a	sustained	effort,	if	we	are	going	to	
change	the	culture	surrounding	communications	be-
tween	the	Government	and	contractors.
Conclusion—While	 I	will	 leave	 to	 others	 to	
judge	how	well	we	did,	I	believe	that	we	did	succeed	
in	stopping,	and	sometimes	reversing,	unsustainable	
and	unhealthy	trends,	some	of	which	had	been	un-
derway	for	more	than	a	decade.	That	is	as	true	with	
respect	to	the	increase	in	procurement	spending	as	
with	respect	to	the	decline	in	the	number	of	acquisi-
tion	professionals.	While	we	did	not	achieve	as	much	
progress	as	we	would	have	 liked,	 for	 the	first	 time	
in	many	years,	some	of	the	key	trends	now	point	in	
the	right	direction.	The	challenge	will	be	to	persist	in	
the	face	of	budgetary	constraints,	which	can	lead	to	
pressure	to	slash	spending,	in	particular	on	invest-
ment	in	the	acquisition	workforce.	We	need	to	keep	
in	mind	the	lessons	of	past	mistakes,	so	that	we	do	
not	repeat	them.
F
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